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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FACIAL
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Katja Kukielski*
As technology companies increase their deployment of facial
recognition technology (FRT), consumers have begun to rebuff attempts
to collect, use, and sell facial recognition data without restraint. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act (CPRA) constitute one such effort. However, consistent with an
increasingly deregulatory view of the First Amendment taken by the
United States Supreme Court over the past decade or so, commercial actors—including now-notorious Clearview AI—have begun to argue that
regulation of FRT is incompatible with the First Amendment.
This Note pushes back against the notion that there is inherent tension between protecting consumers from unrestrained use of FRT and
preserving free speech. Instead, this Note considers the free speech interests at stake during the three main phases of FRT data processing—
collection, use, and disclosure—to determine whether a legislature may
constitutionally regulate these activities. This Note concludes that the
data collection phase is most appropriately analyzed as a form of information-gathering, while companies’ use of the data could be comfortably
regulated as a content-neutral law protecting consumers’ reasonable expectations. While regulation at the disclosure phase presents greater free
speech concerns, such regulation should be permissible when the disclosure does not contribute meaningfully to the purposes behind the First
Amendment. Finally, this Note culminates by evaluating California’s biometric privacy provisions in its CCPA/CPRA scheme, and provides suggestions as to how it might be altered to more coherently protect against
the serious risks posed by FRT while ensuring that it sits comfortably
with the First Amendment.

* Thanks to my family (three dogs included), friends, professors, and the editors and staff
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Special thanks to Sam, for listening to me talk about this
paper for hours on end; to my editor, Alex Murcia, for his thoughtful feedback; and to Professor
Rothman, who introduced me to privacy law and the First Amendment, and whose guidance was
essential to this project’s success.
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Those who already walk submissively will say there is no cause for
alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage.
– Justice William O. Douglas1

When the New York Times published an exposé on then-nascent
technology company Clearview AI in January of 2020, many were
shocked and concerned to find that the company was scraping the internet for photographs for use in its facial recognition app.2 The app
allows users to match photos they input with those that exist on the
internet.3 After the story came out, U.S. senators pressured the company to reconsider its activities domestically and abroad.4 Plaintiffs in
five states filed more than a dozen different lawsuits—including putative class actions.5 While some plaintiffs had posted their photographs
on public social media accounts, they were disturbed to find Clearview
had indexed their photos for use in its app—enabling anyone to snap
a photograph of them, input that photo into the app, and instantaneously identify them.6 Although they had consensually shared their images with the general public, they had not contemplated that Clearview
would use photos to create facial templates—or “faceprints”—that
would then be integrated into a vast database of searchable images.7
More concerning were instances in which Clearview used photos that
were posted by others without the plaintiffs’ knowledge or permission.8 Such an app raises the chilling prospect that it could be used to
identify people at protests, political rallies, abortion clinics, and

1. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 28 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-fac
ial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/CL4F-FY9G].
3. Id.
4. Ryan Mac et al., Senators Are Probing Clearview AI on the Use of Facial Recognition by
Gulf States and International Markets, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020, 3:58 PM)
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/senators-markey-wyden-clearview-ai-facialrecognition [https://perma.cc/87PB-XZKL].
5. Jessica Conditt, Clearview to Rely on First Amendment to Defend Its Face-Tracking Tech,
ENGADGET (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.engadget.com/clearview-first-amendment-lawsuit-def
ense-181859840.html [https://perma.cc/PA2G-WXGX]; see Complaint at 3–7, Renderos v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. RG21091138 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2021).
6. See Complaint at 2–4, Broccolino v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-02222 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 13, 2020).
7. See Complaint at 15–16, Marron v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-02989 (N.D. Ill.
May 20, 2020).
8. See id.
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Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.9 These concerns have already become a reality in Hong Kong, where protesters have had to hide their
faces to avoid recognition,10 and in China, which employs an extensive
network of surveillance cameras as part of its social credit system.11
In response to these lawsuits, Clearview raised several defenses.
It has argued that Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act12—the
statute under which many plaintiffs sued—does not apply to photographs.13 It has also asserted that the federal Communications Decency Act, which protects online service providers from liability for
certain material that appears on their platforms,14 immunizes the company.15 However, one defense may prove most difficult for the plaintiffs to overcome: the First Amendment.
The First Amendment arguments raised by the technology company are nothing new in data and informational privacy conversations.16 Because of the First Amendment, courts have invalidated laws
restricting use of medical information by pharmaceutical marketers,17
laws aimed at shielding the identity of rape victims from widespread
publication,18 and a Federal Communications Commission order that

9. See Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020CH04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28,
2020).
10. Trey Smith, In Hong Kong, Protestors Fight to Stay Anonymous, THE VERGE (Oct. 22,
2019, 10:03 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/22/20926585/hong-kong-china-protestmask-umbrella-anonymous-surveillance [https://perma.cc/MX6A-93GC].
11. Alfred Ng, How China Uses Facial Recognition to Control Human Behavior, CNET
(Aug. 11, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/in-china-facial-recognition-public-shami
ng-and-control-go-hand-in-hand/ [https://perma.cc/KBY9-UJY4]. Interestingly, though many protest the government’s deployment of facial recognition technology, some groups of Chinese citizens view its surveillance techniques as a positive development. See Genia Kostka, China’s Social
Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
1565, 1569 (2019).
12. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–14/99 (2021).
13. See Clearview Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 11, Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 20-cv-512 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2020).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
15. See Defendant’s Reply to Vermont’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9,
Vermont v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 226-3-20 CNCV (Vt. Super. Ct. May 22, 2020).
16. Compare Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014) (arguing that
“for all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current debates in information law,
data is speech”), and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000)
(outlining and responding to arguments for why privacy regulations do not violate the First Amendment), with Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1501, 1512, 1523 (2015) (arguing that “asking ‘is data speech?’ is a poor way to ask a very
important question” and that, consequently, most data privacy laws are constitutional).
17. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011).
18. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
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restricted telecommunications companies from using customers’ data
to market additional products.19
The current expansive view of the First Amendment has worried
a number of scholars precisely because it might give a pass to companies like Clearview and make protecting data very, very difficult, if
not impossible.20 While the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively
on the question of whether and when data (including faceprints) constitutes speech, it has indicated that it is open to taking an expansive
approach.21 Recent decisions suggest that, unless the Court modifies
its currently broad definition of “speech” for purposes of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court is likely to explicitly hold as such in
the near future.22 The most clear-cut—and, to many, worrisome—example of this occurred in Sorrell v. IMS Health,23 in which the Supreme Court struck down as content- and viewpoint-discriminatory a
law that prohibited the use of prescriber-identifying information by
pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes—despite the fact
that it seemed to some like a clear case of commercial regulation.24
Clearview may be one of the most notorious examples of facial
recognition technology (FRT) in recent years, but it is not alone. Despite widespread criticism of Clearview’s tool, a company called
PimEyes has recently launched an identical tool.25 Unlike
19. U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999).
20. See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment’s Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1241, 1242–43 (2020); Nelson Tebbe, A Democratic Political Economy for the First Amendment, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 1020 (2020); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 133, 133; Richards, supra note 16, at 1526–27; Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy
and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1151 (2005); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS
Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855 (2012); Margot
Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 173 (2017); see also Jack M.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–86
(2016) (observing that “the First Amendment has become the most fertile source of constitutional
defenses to business regulation”); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 590 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“If the Court
means to create constitutional barriers to regulatory rules that might affect the content of a commercial message, it has embarked upon an unprecedent task—a task that threatens significant judicial interference with widely accepted regulatory activity.”).
21. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570; see also Bambauer, supra note 16, at 71 (“Justice Kennedy’s
opinion [in Sorrell] very nearly resolved whether data is protected speech.”).
22. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech Is Not “Speech,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 843 (2017)
(pushing back against the Sorrell court’s hint that data may be speech for First Amendment purposes).
23. 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
24. See id. at 593 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Richards, supra note 16, at 1506.
25. See Rachel Metz, Anyone Can Use This Powerful Facial-Recognition Tool—And That’s a
Problem, CNN BUS. (May 4, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/04/tech/pimeyes-facial-recogni
tion/index.html [https://perma.cc/7W6Y-QRLS].
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Clearview—whose main clients are law enforcement—PimEyes
makes its tool available to the general public for free.26 Companies
like Facebook27 and Shutterfly28 have been using facial recognition
technology to identify the subjects of photographs since at least
2010.29 Nor are social media platforms the only players. Facial recognition companies like Churchix,30 FaceFirst, and Ellucian market their
tools to schools and other venues for attendance monitoring.31 Beyond
taking attendance, Ellucian touts its technology’s ability to monitor
facial expressions in real time to detect student engagement and emotional responses to lecture material.32 In the COVID era of online employment interviews, some employers may also use FRT to determine
prospective employees’ moods and personality traits.33 The technology is also being rolled out in commercial and retail contexts to recognize individual customers who enter or (in the virtual world) interact
with the business, to send targeted marketing, and to tailor customer
experiences.34 Stores also use these tools to identify undesirable customers, such as shoplifters or people who have otherwise been banned
from particular venues.35
The growing prevalence of FRT, data collection by large firms,
and other intrusive technologies has spawned legislative action to

26. Id.
27. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Jonathan Shaw,
Comment, FACEbook Confidential: The Privacy Implications of Facebook’s Surreptitious and Exploitative Utilization of Facial Recognition Technology, 31 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENV’T L. 149,
151 (2012) (arguing that the Federal Trade Commission should utilize its section 5 authority to
enjoin Facebook’s use of facial recognition technology).
28. See Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
29. See Camila Domonoske, Facebook Expands Use of Facial Recognition to ID Users in
Photos, NPR (Dec. 19, 2017, 1:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/19/571
954455/facebook-expands-use-of-facial-recognition-to-id-users-in-photos [https://perma.cc/D77C
-LF5V].
30. Facial Recognition Software by Churchix for Biometric Attendance, CHURCHIX,
https://churchix.com [https://perma.cc/HP27-6ZYM].
31. Ronald Bailey, Ban Facial Recognition on College Campuses, Activists Say, REASON
(Jan. 28, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://reason.com/2020/01/28/ban-facial-recognition-on-college-camp
uses/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9Q-VAFB].
32. Raja Saravanan, Facial Recognition Can Give Students Better Service (and Security),
ELLUCIAN, https://www.ellucian.com/blog/facial-recognition-campus-benefits-security-risks
[https://perma.cc/G4EK-4UBB].
33. See Minda Zetlin, AI Is Now Analyzing Candidates’ Facial Expressions During Video Job
Interviews, INC. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/ai-is-now-analyzing-candid
ates-facial-expressions-during-video-job-interviews.html.
34. Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do: Facial Recognition
Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 99 (2017).
35. Id.
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protect privacy in many states.36 For example, Illinois,37 Texas,38 and
Washington,39 among other states, now broadly regulate biometric information, including faceprints.40 In 2018, California joined their
ranks when voters passed the sweeping California Consumer Privacy
Act41 (CCPA), followed quickly by the California Privacy Rights Act
(CPRA), which regulates faceprints, among other things.42 Yet, despite the public support for these statutes and public concern regarding
this technology, the CCPA’s biometric regulations may be struck
down if companies like Clearview successfully argue that the First
Amendment protects their activities.43
Focusing on the use of facial recognition technology by private
actors for commercial purposes, this Note will begin by describing the
inherent risks. I select the commercial focus for three reasons: First, if
limiting FRT in this context is unconstitutional, it is highly unlikely
that uses in other contexts—for example, scientific research or investigative journalism—will be regulable. Given the Supreme Court’s
historically weaker First Amendment protections for commercial
speech and similar types of commercial data usage,44 regulating FRT
when it is used for commercial purposes presents the clearest case for
constitutionality. Second, limiting this inquiry to private actors eliminates obvious Fourth Amendment problems that would arise with
36. See Molly K. McGinley et al., The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On: Biometric Legislation
Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislation-proposed-across-united-states
[https://perma.cc/FCJ6-C3Z6].
37. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1–14/99 (2021).
38. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2021).
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.010 (2021).
40. Various other states regulate facial recognition in more targeted contexts. For example,
Florida prohibits public schools from collecting biometric information (including faceprints) of
students, parents, or siblings. FLA. STAT. § 1002.222(1)(a) (2014).
41. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (West Supp. 2021).
42. Dominique-Chantale Alepin, Panel, Social Media, Right to Privacy and the California
Consumer Privacy Act, 29 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIV. SEC. CAL. LAWS. ASS’N
96, 97 (2019); Brandon P. Reilly & Scott T. Lashway, The California Privacy Rights Act has
Passed: What’s in It?, MANATT (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.manatt.com/insights/newsletters/clie
nt-alert/the-california-privacy-rights-act-has-passed [https://perma.cc/W8TP-PWW6]. In fact, the
CCPA defines (and therefore regulates) personal information quite broadly. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(v)(1).
43. See Margot E. Kaminski & Scott Skinner-Thompson, Free Speech Isn’t a Free Pass for
Privacy Violations, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/03/free-speech-priv
acy-clearview-ai-maine-isps.html [https://perma.cc/GE2W-DNVG].
44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985); see also Felix
T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005 (2017) (arguing that commercial and corporate speech rights are derivative of others’ primary speech rights).
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government use, though, as described below, private and public uses
of data are tightly interwoven.45 Finally, I take this approach because
these are the kinds of uses on which states, including California, have
chosen to focus their regulatory efforts.46
Next, I will consider whether states may restrict businesses’ capture, use, and disclosure of citizens’ faceprints for commercial purposes without running afoul of the First Amendment. The argument
mobilized in favor of the position that FRT regulation is unconstitutional relies on the assertion that facial recognition data, like any other
form of information, is speech subject to the full weight of the First
Amendment.47 Under this line of reasoning—which receives some
support from dictum in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sorrell48—
facial recognition tools create knowledge and thereby allow users of
the technology to act based on the information that the technology provides. However, as I will show below, these arguments—while attractive in the abstract—not only miss the mark under any theory of the
First Amendment, but actually endanger the purposes that the First
Amendment is designed to further. This Note will therefore push back
on the broader argument that faceprints are invariably speech.
Whether faceprints themselves are speech is not the right question
to ask; instead, courts should ask whether various regulations present
a serious risk to freedom of expression. I will next consider three activities pertaining to FRT—collection, use, and disclosure—to determine whether a legislature may regulate these activities in a manner
consistent with the First Amendment. I argue that the collection of
faceprints is most appropriately analyzed as a form of informationgathering subject to some level of intermediate scrutiny. I then argue
that use restrictions are similarly permissible as content-neutral laws
that require companies to act within consumers’ reasonable expectations. By contrast, restrictions on data disclosure present a more difficult question because they appear more like traditional conceptions of
speech with a speaker, listener, and message. However, when companies sell FRT data for purposes that do not contribute meaningfully to

45. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1951–52
(2013).
46. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(d); Joseph J. Lazzarotti et al., Does the CCPA Apply to
Your Business?, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/does-ccpaapply-to-your-business [https://perma.cc/5SAH-YYX4].
47. See Richards, supra note 16, at 1524; Bambauer, supra note 16, at 60.
48. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011).
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the purposes behind the First Amendment, regulation on such disclosures should be subject only to some form of intermediate scrutiny.
Finally, I apply this analysis to the CCPA/CPRA’s biometrics
provisions, making recommendations for how the statute could be altered to more coherently protect against the serious harms raised by
FRT while ensuring that it sits comfortably with the First Amendment.
Two notes before we continue: First, this Note presumes that FRT
identifies subjects accurately. In the context of commercial use, FRT
is dangerous precisely because of the breadth of accurate information
it conveys about its subjects.49 Second, I limit my inquiry to private
use of FRT because government use thereof raises a slew of concerns
related to the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure.50 Nonetheless, even if the government’s direct deployment of FRT were restricted, one must recall that public and private
uses are intertwined.51 In the current state of Fourth Amendment law,
allowing private actors to capture and make use of faceprints means
that the government may acquire that data from private actors.52 Perhaps the most jarring example is that of Clearview. The company has
formed institutional arrangements with law enforcement to provide
them with information on all citizens (irrespective of suspicion of any
49. See Bambauer, supra note 16, at 66. Additionally, false statements of fact present First
Amendment concerns that are beyond the scope of this Note.
50. See, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 409 (2014); Adriana Bass, Note, Smile! You’re on Camera: Police Departments’
Use of Facial Recognition Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). These concerns are only exacerbated by the tendency for facial recognition technology to be less accurate when identifying subjects who are not white and male, causing the potential
for misidentification and, consequently, false arrests of minorities. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find
State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers
-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/C5KN-69UY]. Others worry that even if this bias is eliminated, law enforcement groups might use the technology to
target vulnerable populations, such as undocumented immigrants. Id.; see Kashmir Hill, Your Face
Is Not Your Own, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/
magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html [https://perma.cc/DAW9-KUBT]. For example,
some believe that states have allowed undocumented immigrants to obtain drivers’ licenses so that
ICE can then use the photographs to create faceprints. See Alex Najibi, Racial Discrimination in
Face Recognition Technology, SCI. IN THE NEWS (Oct. 24, 2020), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash
/2020/racial-discrimination-in-face-recognition-technology/ [https://perma.cc/8WSK-9HJY].
51. Richards, supra note 45, at 1951–52.
52. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 141, 144 (2014); Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373,
1431 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Julie E. Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy
Law, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (Mar. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Cohen,
How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law], https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-not-to-write-a-priv
acy-law [https://perma.cc/8ZF7-423Y].
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one individual) that it likely could not ascertain on its own.53 Thus,
federal and state governments can—and do—contract with private
businesses to acquire vast amounts of personal information on ordinary people, effectively outsourcing their surveillance to circumvent
direct restrictions on governmental data collection.54 This phenomenon is not unique to FRT, but it is particularly worrisome given the
widespread surveillance enabled by the technology.
I. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY HARMS
Any discussion of facial recognition—or data privacy in general—would be incomplete without a meaningful appreciation of the
risks imposed by the technology. Further, embarking on a constitutional analysis will require an identification of the relevant state interests furthered by FRT regulations.
One might argue that FRT is nothing truly new—in some sense,
FRT replicates the human capacity to identify faces. Of course, no one
would argue that it violates their privacy to be recognized by an acquaintance or even some other person with whom one has an indirect
relationship. Critically, however, FRT enhances this ability far beyond
ordinary human capacity, allowing companies to instantaneously and
accurately identify consumers—even when they think they are
alone.55 FRT can also discern information about a person’s age, gender,56 attention span, and emotional reaction to various stimuli.57 Accordingly, facial recognition technology allows individuals to be identified and analyzed by entities with whom they may have never
interacted. It also enables these activities to occur at great distances
and, if surreptitiously captured through the cameras in people’s devices, in contexts in which people would reasonably assume they are
alone.58 More insidiously, when it combines information in the
53. Isadora Neroni Rezende, Facial Recognition in Police Hands: Assessing the ‘Clearview
Case’ from a European Perspective, 11 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 375, 376 (2020).
54. Richards, supra note 20, at 1159.
55. For example, Walgreens and Kroger have installed facial scanners in their stores to determine shoppers’ age and gender to deliver targeted ads. Anthony Tacconi, Walgreens and Kroger
Sued for Using Cameras with Facial Recognition, GOODMAN ALLEN DONNELLY (Oct. 15, 2020,
10:54 AM), https://www.goodmanallen.com/blog/walgreens-and-kroger-sued-for-using-cameraswith-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/GU2U-5W2Q].
56. Id.
57. Andy Lau, Facial Recognition in Global Marketing, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Apr. 25,
2020),
https://towardsdatascience.com/facial-recognition-in-global-marketing-8d0ca0b313c7
[https://perma.cc/ECX8-DV77].
58. See Nakar & Greenbaum, supra note 34, at 96.
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aggregate, facial recognition technology can effectively be used to surveil individuals by constructing comprehensive, permanent records of
their whereabouts.59 The Ninth Circuit has formally acknowledged
these risks as not only real but also legally cognizable in cases discussing Article III standing—another issue that has plagued courts in data
privacy cases.60 In Patel v. Facebook, Inc.,61 the court addressed the
issue of whether plaintiffs whose faceprints had been nonconsensually
captured by Facebook had sufficiently demonstrated an injury-infact.62 Holding that they had, the court articulated the problem with
Facebook’s conduct:
[T]he facial-recognition technology at issue here can obtain
information that is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled,” which would be almost impossible without such
technology. Once a face template of an individual is created,
Facebook can use it to identify that individual in any of the
other hundreds of millions of photos uploaded to Facebook
each day, as well as determine when the individual was present at a specific location. Facebook can also identify the individual’s Facebook friends or acquaintances who are present in the photo. Taking into account the future development
of such technology . . . it seems likely that a face-mapped individual could be identified from a surveillance photo taken
on the streets or in an office building.63

59. See id. at 91.
60. See Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms (Feb. 9, 2021) (GWU Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 2021-11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782222 [https://perma.cc/H4K8NQ5V].
61. 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).
62. Id. at 1273. It is worth noting that the Northern District of Illinois has approached the
question of injury-in-fact in FRT-based BIPA cases with more skepticism. See Rivera v. Google,
Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1010–11 (N.D. Ill. 2018). However, in concluding that the plaintiffs had
not sufficiently alleged a sufficiently concrete harm, the court expressly based its holding on the
fact that the legislative findings had not articulated any specific harms other than the risk of identity
theft. See id. The court expressly noted that its evaluation might change if the Illinois Legislature
updated these findings, observing that “[i]t is not hard to imagine more concrete concerns arising
from facial-recognition technology, especially as it becomes more accurate and more widespread
(along with video-surveillance cameras) to the point that private entities are able to use the technology to pinpoint where people have been over extended time periods.” Id. at 1011 n.15.
63. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1273.
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Based on such capabilities, there are three core harms that private
use of accurate FRT can cause: chilling effects,64 disclosure harms,65
and loss of autonomy.66
First, because FRT can allow for mass surveillance (as exemplified by Clearview), it can cause chilling effects on behavior. While
any mass amalgamation of data could in effect chill activities, the risk
is particularly salient in the context of FRT both because of the amount
of information it can reveal to users of the technology, and because it
is extraordinarily difficult to avoid. While one might be able to avoid
sharing, for example, an embarrassing video purchase history simply
by not purchasing such videos, there is no comparable choice when it
comes to showing one’s face in public. Even when FRT collects imagery posted publicly on the internet (as Clearview purports to67),
these photos often collect information about people who never consented to the photo or its publication.68 Thus, the continuous monitoring of people that FRT enables is distinct from the usual manner in
which our activities are visible to those around us.69 This risk is particularly prominent when FRT data is combined with other forms of
information such as location data, past purchases, emails, and internet
browsing history.70 In the aggregate, this enables companies to construct comprehensive records of individuals’ daily activities and—to
the extent that people’s facial expressions71 and online activities reflect their inner lives—even their thoughts. As Professor Margot Kaminski writes, the architecture of our world—walls, physical distance,
forgetfulness over time—generally permits us to make informed
choices about what activities to engage in so as to manage our own
64. See Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 478 (2015).
65. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 529 (2006).
66. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 149–50
(2017).
67. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 1, ACLU v.
Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020CH04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020).
68. See Metz, supra note 25.
69. See Solove, supra note 65, at 493 (“Certainly, we all watch or listen, even when others
may not want us to, and we often do not view this as problematic. However, when done in a certain
manner—such as continuous monitoring—surveillance has problematic effects.”).
70. For example, Clearview allegedly harvests not only faceprints but also associated
metadata, such as time and location information. Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241,
1243 (7th Cir. 2021).
71. See Kiely Kuligowski, Facial Recognition Advertising: The New Way to Target Ads at
Consumers, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Jul. 18, 2019), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/15213walgreens-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/9FSG-MRHD].
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exposure to others.72 Of course, sometimes increased transparency can
be good: for example, by making sure police officers and other public
officials do not abuse their power. Other times, it forecloses people
from engaging in socially productive and valuable behaviors, such as
checking out a controversial book at a library, seeking appropriate
medical care, or attending a religious service.73
As Professor Julie E. Cohen argues, these chilling effects threaten
activities essential to free speech and innovation—concerns that, paradoxically, feature prominently in arguments opposing data privacy.74
For example, though some argue that increased data privacy regulations will limit developments in technology, Professor Cohen asserts
that surveillance actually hampers innovation because it requires space
to experiment and therefore freedom from surveillance.75 Innovation
“thrives most fully when circumstances yield serendipitous encounters
with new resources and ideas, and afford the intellectual and material
breathing room to experiment with them.”76 Her observations in this
respect are supported by a multitude of studies documenting the
chilling effect that surveillance has on human behavior.77 Michel Foucault theorized that surveilled prisoners would conform their behavior
in the knowledge that they were being watched.78 Ultimately, per Foucault, this ingrained expectation would render guards superfluous; as
long as the possibility existed that they were being watched, the prisoners would act accordingly.79 In a more contemporary context, researchers have found that the perceived ubiquity of social networking
has caused humans to alter their offline behavior out of concern that
their actions will be nonconsensually captured and uploaded to social
72. Kaminski, supra note 20, at 171.
73. See Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1608 (2017).
74. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1919 (2013).
75. Id. at 1918.
76. Id. at 1920.
77. See, e.g., Ben Marder et al., The Extended ‘Chilling’ Effect of Facebook: The Cold Reality
of Ubiquitous Social Networking, 60 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 582 (2016); Jonathon W. Penney,
Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online: A Comparative Case Study,
INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 2017, at 1; Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 64; Dawinder S. Sidhu,
The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by MuslimAmericans, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375 (2007); Alex Marthews & Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior (Feb. 17, 2017), https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412564 [https://perma.cc/HMZ8-BWD9]. See generally Richards, supra note 45, at 1962–64 (describing the dangers of surveillance and proposing
suggestions to guide the future development of laws targeting surveillance).
78. Brown, supra note 50, at 414.
79. Id.; Solove, supra note 65, at 495.
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networks.80 Accordingly, because processes of experimentation often
involve engaging with controversial or unpopular ideas, and such experimentation is a necessary precursor to innovation and free speech,
this chilling effect threatens activities that are vital to our society.81
This illuminates the flaw in the argument that privacy and free speech
are diametrically opposed.82
Separately from chilling effects, widespread facial recognition
also exacerbates the risk of harmful disclosures that leave people embarrassed or otherwise overly exposed—such as by increasing the risk
of identity theft. The more widespread the technology is (and the more
secretive), the more likely that such technology will ultimately capture
information about a subject that they might prefer others not to know.
Sometimes disclosure of this information will lead to a merely dignitary harm—such as if FRT were to catch a person visiting a sex shop.
However, it can also allow a user to uncover information about a person’s whereabouts or activities that might leave the depicted individual vulnerable to stalking or harassment. In some respects, disclosure
harms are related to the harm of chilling effects in that it is generally
the risk of such disclosures that cause people to act differently. However, the ultimate disclosure is not necessary to cause chilling effects;
the mere risk of disclosure is itself sufficient.83 Perhaps the most common type of disclosure harm is the heightened risk of identity theft that
accompanies data breaches.84 Unlike credit card information or social
security numbers, faceprints cannot realistically be changed. Even if
no such theft occurs, people often experience emotional distress and
must spend a great deal of time and money to detect and protect against
fraudulent activity.85
Beyond chilling effects and the risk of disclosure, mass collection
of FRT results in a loss in autonomy that is perhaps subtler—but even
80. Marder et al., supra note 77, at 585–86.
81. Cohen, supra note 74, at 1920; see also Richards, supra note 45, at 1935 (“Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment with new,
controversial, or deviant ideas.”).
82. For a detailed argument to this effect, see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY:
RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015). See also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF
POWER 110 (2019) (“The Constitution is exploited to shelter a range of novel practices that are
antidemocratic in their aims and consequences and fundamentally destructive of the enduring First
Amendment values intended to protect the individual from abusive power.”).
83. See Solove, supra note 65, at 494–95.
84. See id. at 488–91.
85. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (2018).
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more fundamental. Most crucial to Professor Cohen’s argument is that
surveillance threatens democratic society not just by inhibiting innovation and free speech but by allowing data processors to access information that gives them immense power over the ideas and products
to which people are exposed.86 In the context of FRT, collection of
this information can reveal powerful inferences about human behavior
and even inner thoughts. The cameras in our devices both at home and
in public make this even more so.87 In the “massively-intermediated
environments” in which we now live, technology companies have a
huge degree of power to affect people’s environments,88 and they rely
on vast amounts of information about individuals in order to further
their own economic and political agendas. When technology companies have such comprehensive knowledge about consumers, it threatens the capabilities essential to producing individuals who can effectively engage in self-government.89 In other words, the huge amount
of data that companies capture about individuals through surveillance
processes allows these companies to subtly affect consumers’ ideas
and choices through personalized feedback loops, or “filter bubbles.”90
Thus, FRT can cause three different harms: First, because of its
ability to provide huge amounts of information about anything a person does inside or outside their home, it can cause behavioral alterations that are socially undesirable, many of which actually inhibit free
speech. Second, because FRT has the power to pick up images of people that contain sensitive information (either individually, or when
combined), it can cause unanticipated dignitary harms and exposure.
Finally, even when data does not result in the publication of any information whatsoever, the data can be used to amalgamate information
that can then be used to exercise control over a consumer.
Of course, facial recognition, like all other technologies, can also
serve as a tool for good. For example, many Apple consumers have
come to enjoy the convenience of unlocking their devices with their
faces, as well as the added security that comes with linking access to
one’s unique faceprint. Because faceprints are unique and often

86.
87.
(2015).
88.
89.
90.

See Cohen, supra note 66, at 149–50; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 82, at 94.
Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1120
Cohen, supra note 66, at 150.
Cohen, supra note 74, at 1917.
Id.
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durable over a person’s lifespan,91 faceprints are, somewhat ironically,
useful for preventing security breaches.92 In fact, facial recognition
tool PimEyes markets itself as a tool for managing one’s online presence, such as by determining whether someone else is using one’s photos.93 Touchless security systems may also be more desirable in light
of increased hygiene concerns arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic.94
However, problems with the technology lurk beneath the palatable surface of convenience and personalization. Privacy laws must be
built to address the above concerns stemming from nonconsensual collection of faceprints, their sale to third parties, and their use for unexpected purposes.
II. ARE FACEPRINTS A FORM OF SPEECH?
The argument that laws regulating FRT like the CCPA/CPRA are
content-based and merit strict scrutiny might go something like this:
Faceprints are information, and information is speech, so faceprints
are speech.95 Because faceprints are speech, regulating the capture or
collection of faceprints is a regulation on speech-creation (akin to the
act of writing a book), without which protection of the faceprint would
have no meaning.96 Regulating the disclosure and/or use of faceprints
is a content-based regulation on speech because one would need to
examine whether the information being disclosed or used is a faceprint. Accordingly, all laws regulating the capture, use, and/or disclosure of faceprints require strict scrutiny.97 Thus, the preliminary
91. Nakar & Greenbaum, supra note 34, at 95.
92. See Thorin Klosowski, Facial Recognition Is Everywhere. Here’s What We Can Do About
It, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/how-facial-recognitionworks/ [https://perma.cc/CQ2Z-LT7C].
93. PIMEYES, https://pimeyes.com/en [https://perma.cc/BU3S-YCU5].
94. See Lofred Madzou, Facial Recognition Can Help Re-Start Post-Pandemic Travel. Here’s
How to Limit the Risks, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/
12/facial-recognition-technology-and-travel-after-covid-19-freedom-versus-privacy/
[https://
perma.cc/7KW7-GVYJ].
95. See Richards, supra note 16, at 1524; Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011)
(observing that “[t]his Court has held that the creation and dissemination of information are speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment”); see also Kaminski, supra note 20, at 190 (acknowledging that if recording is speech the same way a movie is, then regulation of all recordings would
always be subject to strict scrutiny).
96. See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2010).
97. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 52, at 1409 (“The First Amendment argument against
data privacy protection begins by assuming that the collection, processing, and exchange of personally-identified data are ‘speech,’ and then asserts that regulation of these activities cannot survive the requisite scrutiny.”); see also Richards, supra note 16, at 1524 (“The ‘data-is-speech’
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inquiry would seem to be whether faceprints themselves are a form of
speech.98
This line of reasoning is alluringly simple, and, admittedly, it may
be most consistent with the Court’s recent tendency to make broad
statements about its First Amendment jurisprudence and undergo rigid
free speech analyses.99 For example, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,100 the
Court suggested that a regulation would undergo strict scrutiny “if
argument has a certain superficial appeal. After all, if the First Amendment is about protecting
people’s ability to share ideas and information, and data is information, then the First Amendment
should protect people’s ability to share data.”).
Interestingly, Clearview has not made this precise argument in the lawsuit filed against it
by the ACLU in Vermont state court. That is, it has not expressly argued that faceprints themselves
are speech. Instead, in its motion to dismiss, Clearview’s argument first focuses on its search engine
as the relevant “speech” restricted by BIPA: “BIPA’s restrictions on the collection of ‘biometric
information’ in publicly-available photographs violate the First Amendment because they inhibit
Clearview’s ability to use this public information in Clearview’s search engine,” which is “protected speech under the First Amendment.” Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its
Motion to Dismiss, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., supra note 67, at 16–17. This is perhaps a less
daunting argument for the Illinois Circuit Court to accept, given that the Supreme Court has not
expressly held that all information is always speech, and such an argument, if successful, would
jeopardize a great number of informational privacy laws that regulate certain categories of private
information. Yet, Clearview’s argument runs into problems at the next step of the inquiry: whether
BIPA is content-based. BIPA does not regulate only speech with a particular content or viewpoint
the way that the statute did in Sorrell because it does not target particular expressive uses of the
data. Compare 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2021) (“No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or
biometric information . . . .”), with Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558–59 (2011) (“A . . .
pharmacy . . . shall not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records containing prescriberidentifiable information . . . for marketing or promoting a prescription drug . . . .” (emphasis
added) (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2011))). That is, while the Vermont statute
specifically targeted pharmaceutical marketing, BIPA does not target search engines. Clearview
appears to anticipate this distinction between its case and Sorrell; it pivots later on in its brief when
it argues that BIPA is a content-based restriction because it targets “biometric identifiers”—not
search engines. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss, ACLU v.
Clearview AI, Inc., supra note 67, at 19.
98. At risk of stating the obvious, faceprints do not fall into any of the traditional exceptions
from First Amendment coverage outlined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942):
fighting words, true threats, obscenity, and (to some extent) false statement of facts. Id. at 571–72.
Inaccurate faceprinting might well present a different issue with regard to the Court’s differential
treatment of false statements of fact, but FRT is presumed accurate for purposes of this Article.
Alternatively, one might argue that courts should create a new categorical exception for regulations
on either privacy regulations more broadly, or even FRT specifically. Yet, the Court has set the bar
extremely high for the government to establish a new categorical exception in addition to those
outlined in Chaplinsky. Per the Court’s holding in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010),
one cannot not “create” a new category of wholly unprotected speech unless that category has been
“historically unprotected,” even if the Court had not yet overtly acknowledged it. Id. at 472. It
would be impossible to make such a showing for new technologies.
99. See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552; Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); Robert
C. Post & Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity, 130 YALE L.J.
86, 134 (2020).
100. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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[the] law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed,” even if that content-based restriction
clearly did not indicate any censorial motive.101 However, even if one
considers the controversial definition of “content based” as articulated
in Reed, regulating faceprints would seem to pass muster. A regulation
on faceprints does not apply “because of the topic discussed or the idea
or message expressed.”102 These regulations would apply irrespective
of the particular information derived from a faceprint; one would not
need to “read” the faceprint to determine the law’s application. Further, consider the purpose of the general prohibition on content-based
laws: such laws lend themselves to “invidious, thought-control” purposes because, instead of prohibiting a particular viewpoint, the government might wholly excise a topic from public conversation.103 Realistically, no such concerns arise with regulation of FRT, which
would not prohibit the public from discussing any particular topic, assuming the regulation did not target only people who wished to voice
particular viewpoints.104
Regardless, I believe the speech-versus-privacy tensions are best
resolved by considering the First Amendment and privacy interests at
stake in various activities—collection, use, and disclosure—to determine whether such regulations run counter to the main theoretical purposes of the First Amendment: contributing to public discourse, enriching the marketplace of ideas, and furthering individual selfexpression.105 In such instances, the law would need to overcome strict
scrutiny.
III. WHEN ARE FACEPRINTS “SPEECH” FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
With the question of, “Are faceprints speech?” set aside, the more
pertinent question now presents itself: When are restrictions on faceprints restrictions on speech? Or rather, to use the oft-quoted words of
Professor Frederick Schauer, when are they speech that is “salient” to
the First Amendment?106
101. Id. at 2227–28.
102. Id.
103. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring).
105. See Kaminski, supra note 20, at 180.
106. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).
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Professor Schauer says “salient” because not all communications
are considered speech subject to full First Amendment protection.107
For example, holding an attorney liable for malpractice does not raise
constitutional concern because attorney advice is not seen as implicating the kind of speech the First Amendment was intended to protect.108
The same is true for sexual harassment, hiring assassins, and insider
trading.109 The Supreme Court has indeed acknowledged this principle: “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”110
Thus, scholars and courts alike have engaged with three main theoretical bases for the First Amendment to ascertain when that communication implicates core First Amendment values that merit stringent
review prior to being restricted.111 These three bases are loosely labelled as follows: public discourse, the “marketplace of ideas,” and
individual self-expression.112 For example, Professors Danielle Keats
Citron and Mary Anne Franks have relied on these theoretical frameworks to argue that criminalizing the disclosure of nonconsensual pornography (commonly termed “revenge porn”) is consistent with the
First Amendment notwithstanding that disclosure of images is a communicative act.113 In fact, in upholding one such law, the Illinois Supreme Court made similar observations.114 The federal Supreme Court
has embarked on similar investigations in according a lower level of

107. Id.; Richards, supra note 16, at 1507; Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 843; Balkin, supra note
20, at 1210–11.
108. Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 867–68.
109. Richards, supra note 16, at 1507.
110. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) (identifying the traditional exceptions to First Amendment
coverage, as well as other laws that regulate language without any apparent conflict with the First
Amendment); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1529 (2013) (“[E]verything
from nonpolitical vandalism through political assassination ‘sends a message,’ but not all of that
can reasonably be speech.”); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1274 (1995) (“Navigation charts for aircraft do not constitutionally register as speech
because we perceive them as imbued with the same constitutional value as any other goods for sale
in the marketplace.”).
111. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 20, at 180; Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks,
Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 385–86 (2014).
112. Kaminski, supra note 20, at 180; Citron & Franks, supra note 111, at 385–86.
113. Citron & Franks, supra note 111, at 385–86.
114. See People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 458 (Ill. 2019).
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First Amendment protection to commercial speech115 and in according
full protections to highly distressing speech relating to matters of public import.116 Accordingly, I consider each of the three theories of the
First Amendment in turn to determine whether, under any of the theories, regulation of faceprints implicates these concerns.117
First, under a traditional public discourse or self-governance theory, speech is worthy of the highest degree of First Amendment protection when it contributes meaningfully to processes of democratic
self-governance.118 Broadly speaking, adherents of this theory see
speech rights as a political right fundamentally tied to the existence
and exercise of democratic citizenship.119 Thus, speech that constitutes
“public discourse” is seen as receiving the highest First Amendment
protection.120 However, even within this broader theory, scholars profusely debate its meaning. Many scholars see democratic citizenship
as involving far more than just participation in elections; under this
theory, democracy entails making people believe that they are invested
in and capable of changing the law.121 Even more broadly, other scholars define “public discourse” as “communicative acts deemed necessary for the formation of public opinion.”122 Thus, matters of public
discourse deserve the highest level of judicial scrutiny because they
115. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
(1976) (observing that commercial speech merits some level of First Amendment protection, because “[i]t is a matter of public interest that [private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed” and that “it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how [the free enterprise] system ought to be regulated”).
116. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452, 454, 458–59 (2011) (reasoning that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could not lie where the speech at issue concerned matters
of public concern because “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’” (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59, 758 n.5 (1985) (“We have long recognized that not all
speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is
‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
117. For a similar application of these theories in other contexts, see Citron & Franks, supra
note 111, at 385–86 (laws criminalizing nonconsensual pornography); Barry P. McDonald, The
First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 272–73 (2004) (information-gathering).
118. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011).
119. See Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 873.
120. Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 136.
121. See Post, supra note 118, at 482 (“Democracy is achieved when those who are subject to
law believe that they are also potential authors of law.”).
122. Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 136; see also Balkin, supra note 20, at 1210 (defining
“public discourse” as “the processes of communication through which ideas and opinions circulate
in a community to produce public opinion”).

(11) 55.1_KUKIELSKI_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

FIRST AMENDMENT AND FACIAL RECOGNITION

2/4/22 1:52 PM

251

influence culture, encompassing scientific knowledge, entertainment,
and other activities that shape political and cultural values.123 Under
this broader approach to public discourse theory, the First Amendment
comfortably protects less overtly political speech, such as abstract art,
music, and even tabloid gossip.
Applying this standard, FRT regulations warrant strict constitutional scrutiny when they inhibit the free formation of public opinion.
This might occur if the government were to restrain a newspaper from
publishing a story using information derived from FRT data. It is clear,
however, that any and all actions regarding faceprints do not always
contribute to public opinion, particularly in the commercial context.
When a business covertly collects individuals’ faceprints to ultimately
sell the data to a larger data broker, public opinion is not enriched at
all. Nor does FRT further public discussion when companies collect
the data to provide targeted advertising; advertising is generally
thought to provide useful information for individuals to choose which
products and services to buy, not to contribute meaningfully to public
discussion.124
Second, the “marketplace of ideas” theory views the First
Amendment as necessary to ensure that individuals have access to a
wide variety of speech so that they can make their own judgments
about what speech they deem most persuasive and thereby embark on
a so-called “search for truth.”125 In other words, courts protect speech
so that people “can shop amongst competing ideas in a search for
‘truth.’”126 The theory gets its roots from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States127: “the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market.”128 At first glance, this theory seems to provide the most
support for lax privacy regulation because recordings of facts often
play a role in individuals’ searches for truth—for example, recordings
published by the media often help the public to determine what is true,
as Professor Kaminski has pointed out.129 However, to observe that
faceprints could theoretically contribute to the marketplace of ideas—
123. See Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 136–38; Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 874.
124. See Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 140.
125. Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1038, 1040.
126. Kaminski, supra note 20, at 180.
127. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
128. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Tsesis, supra note 125, at 1038–39; Vincent
Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
129. Kaminski, supra note 20, at 180–81.

(11) 55.1_KUKIELSKI_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

252

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/4/22 1:52 PM

[Vol. 55:231

for example, if a researcher used FRT to conduct psychological research—misses the mark. As Professor Julie E. Cohen argues, personally-identified data is generally not collected, used, or sold for its expressive content in the commercial context.130 That is, companies
generally do not collect data to “read” it, or even to produce forms of
knowledge to which the public would be exposed.131 Instead, it is used
to “categoriz[e] and segment[] a customer base.”132 Of course, there
may be instances where companies genuinely do inspect faceprints
and create public discourse therefrom, such as if medical researchers
were to rely on the data to reveal the efficacy—or absence—of social
distancing. However, behind-the-curtain faceprint harvesting and use
by private, commercial entities for commercial purposes does not contribute to any metaphorical “marketplace of ideas.” The point here is
that faceprints might be used in service of the marketplace of ideas,
and therefore speech, depending on the context—but, in the commercial context, where private actors profit through having sole control
over personal data, this is an unrealistic expectation.133
Finally, under a self-expression theory of free speech, the First
Amendment exists in service of the free development and operation of
the individual’s mind.134 Those who take issue with this view of the
First Amendment often do so because of the doctrine’s perceived
shapelessness and the resulting difficulty in drawing lines as to
whether and when something is “speech” for purposes of the First
Amendment.135 Moreover, some view this theory’s emphasis on the
value of autonomy as necessitating a laissez-faire approach to speech
regulation.136 However, proponents of the self-expression theory argue that this need not be so. According to Professor Seana Valentine
130. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 52, at 1413–14.
131. See id. at 1417–18.
132. Id.
133. The Supreme Court recognized a similar distinction in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 n.8 (1985) (plurality opinion), in which the Court held that
a particular credit report at issue warranted lower First Amendment protection because it did not
involve a “matter of public concern.” The Court left open the door as to whether other credit reports
might theoretically fulfill that purpose. Id.
134. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011).
135. See, e.g., Post, supra note 118, at 479.
136. See Tsesis, supra note 125, at 1031; see also Post, supra note 118, at 480 (“Because both
speech and autonomy are pervasive, using the value of autonomy to protect speech creates the
distinct risk of Lochnerism.”); Kaminski, supra note 20, at 181–82 (observing that adopting an
autonomy view of the First Amendment encourages the broadest form of First Amendment protection).
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Shiffrin, a true commitment to autonomy requires recognizing that
there is a more complex relationship between individual autonomy,
interpersonal relationships, and democratic self-rule.137 Accordingly,
an autonomy theory of free speech does not require prioritizing individual desires over all democratic outcomes.138 Whatever the merits
of these broader criticisms, one feature of the self-expression theory is
most pertinent to the question of commercial use of FRT. Shiffrin
makes much of the distinction between speech from human speakers
and speech from corporations: “On the other hand, protection for commercial and non-press, business corporate speech is a less central matter, one that reasonably may involve weaker protections and may reasonably rely heavily on more instrumental concerns.”139 To the extent
that FRT is employed by commercial entities (the focus of this Note),
it would be difficult to say that the technology contributes meaningfully to self-expression when it is wholly automated and controlled by
corporations. Thus, a self-expression theory most likely provides the
weakest rationale for why the First Amendment would foreclose states
from regulating FRT.
Recent debate about the right to record may complicate this inquiry somewhat. With increasing litigation surrounding recordings of
police and agricultural facilities, both scholars and courts have been
forced to confront the question of whether and when courts and legislatures can regulate the capture of audiovisual recordings, even though
they are plainly speech protected by the First Amendment.140 Accepting that there is a general First Amendment right to take photos or
videos regardless of whether the matter depicted is one of public concern, the rationale for that right does not neatly map onto faceprints.
Professor Seth Kreimer has described image capture as part of a culturally recognized form of expression and communication.141 His argument has significant force in today’s culture, where individuals frequently post and discuss each other’s photographs on social media.
137. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 553
(2011).
138. Id. at 553–54.
139. Shiffrin, supra note 134, at 286.
140. See, e.g., Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3rd Cir. 2017); Am. Civ. Liberties
Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Stein, 466 F.
Supp. 3d 547 (M.D.N.C. 2020); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011); Kaminski,
supra note 20.
141. Kreimer, supra note 140, at 373.
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Further, this argument fits comfortably with any theoretical framework for the First Amendment. Under a public discourse theory, photographs contribute to conversations about culture and help people to
feel invested and involved in their societies. Under a self-expression
theory, photographs are an increasingly common form of individual
self-expression, especially considering the widespread use of social
media platforms like Instagram. Even considering the marketplace of
ideas theory, photographs and recordings often help people to determine what is true and what is not. However, no such across-the-board
observations could be made with faceprints, particularly in the commercial context, given that faceprints do not constitute a “familiar
mode” for corporations (or individuals) to express themselves.142
Of course, any neat resolution of the driving theory behind the
First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Note (and perhaps indeed
impossible). Yet, regardless of the theoretical framework one
adopts—public discourse, the marketplace of ideas, or self-expression—faceprints do not always contribute to communications salient
to the First Amendment. The proper inquiry, then, is when do they?
A. Collection: Information-Gathering
Although faceprints are not always speech, they may be an ingredient in protected speech, thus implicating the First Amendment on
some level. Thus, the collection, use, and disclosure of faceprints implicates the First Amendment because FRT has the power to contribute to speech protected by the First Amendment, such as scientific
studies or journalism. This proposition should be far less startling than
the broader assertion that all information is speech. For example, one
might intuitively feel that the First Amendment would have something
to say about a law forbidding people from buying ink—or, as in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue.,143 burdensomely taxing it.144
There are two approaches one might take at this point: first, one
might consider such a law a restriction on the “creation of speech.”
142. Cf. id. at 372 (providing examples of common means of expression and communication,
such as music, dancing, and parades); Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being
Mapped): Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of
Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 139 (2012) (noting that “telling stories with
photographically captured light has become . . . a familiar mode of expressing oneself”).
143. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
144. Id. at 583.
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Framing collection as an act of speech-creation would likely subject
laws regulating collection to increased scrutiny because such an act
would be bound up in the ultimate speech.145 Multiple scholars have
suggested this approach in the context of rights to record and capture
images.146 They rely on the idea that such imagery is always speech
because it is part of a recognized communications medium.147
Alternatively, one might consider it a form of information gathering. Collection restrictions would then receive a lower degree of
scrutiny as an act that is not intrinsically expressive but nonetheless
contributes to expression.148 Because faceprints do not inherently contribute to public discourse, self-expression, or the marketplace of ideas
absent some further use, I argue that the proper analytical framework
would be to think of faceprint collection as a form of informationgathering rather than speech creation.
Accepting that a strong rationale exists as to why laws restraining
information-gathering must warrant First Amendment scrutiny, courts
have been clear that the right of free speech does not grant citizens full
license to gather information however they wish.149 For example, in
Bartnicki v. Vopper,150 the Supreme Court distinguished between the
news-gathering act of illegally intercepting a phone call by one party,
and the subsequent communicative act of disclosing the information
by a third party unrelated to the interceptor.151 The Court held that the
latter clearly constituted speech.152 However, the Court was clear to
note that, while the disclosing or publishing of the recorded call constituted speech, its holding did not mean that the First Amendment
immunized individuals who gather information unlawfully; indeed, it
called such an argument “frivolous” and reaffirmed the idea that otherwise valid laws that may have the effect of restraining newsgathering do not draw First Amendment scrutiny.153 Thus, though the original interceptor was not a party to the action, the Court suggested that
the initial interception would have been regulable.154 This is consistent
145. Jared Mullen, Note, Information Gathering or Speech Creation: How to Think About a
First Amendment Right to Record, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 803, 804 (2020).
146. See id. at 805; Kreimer, supra note 140, at 373.
147. E.g., Kreimer, supra note 140, at 373.
148. See Kaminski, supra note 20, at 190.
149. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972).
150. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
151. See id. at 517, 526–27.
152. Id. at 527.
153. Id. at 532 n.19.
154. See id. at 525.
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with its earlier statement that the “right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”155 Scholars
have reached similar conclusions. For example, Professor Cohen has
argued that the First Amendment does not guarantee general social
practices of pervasive data collecting, as distinct from the practice of
publishing information.156 Professor Jane Bambauer, too, acknowledges that there are limits to the information-gatherer’s ability to investigate.157 So if the right to gather information may be restrained,
the question is then, do prohibitions on the collection of faceprints fall
within that acceptable boundary?
Some limitations on information-gathering are clearly defensible
and don’t raise any First Amendment concern—for example, laws prohibiting trespass onto private property or assaulting mail delivery
workers.158 These regulations are uncontroversial in light of the First
Amendment because they clearly seek to address harms that occur irrespective of whether the defendant is engaging in the conduct to gain
access to information.159 Take the tort of trespass: in terms of whether
one could be held liable for the tort, liability applies evenly to the defendant who breaks into a home to steal jewelry and the defendant who
does so in order to plant a recording device. Few would suggest that a
reporter would be shielded from liability for trespass even if they did
so for the purpose of writing a news story, though whether the reporter
can then be held liable for subsequent publication of the information
obtained during the trespass is a different question.160
By contrast, laws that impose disproportionate penalties on people who engage in protected speech pose First Amendment problems.
For example, in Western Watersheds Project v. Michael,161 the Tenth
Circuit distinguished between the State of Wyoming’s ordinary trespass law and its statute imposing heightened civil and criminal liability
155. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
156. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 52, at 1429–30.
157. See Bambauer, supra note 16, at 78–79.
158. Id.
159. But see Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that
Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1997) (arguing that
even laws of general applicability should require a balancing of First Amendment values against
countervailing state interests and endorsing an “actual malice” standard for imposing tort liability
that arises from acts of newsgathering).
160. Moreover, under Bartnicki, a third-party recipient of the information gathered via an act
of trespass would not be liable so long as the information constituted a matter of public concern.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001).
161. 869 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2017).
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on individuals who trespassed for the purpose of collecting resource
data.162 In doing so, the court emphasized that the case concerned not
the constitutionality of punishing trespass, but rather the differential
treatment of trespassing when the person does so to collect resource
data.163 That is, the First Amendment was implicated where the statute
treated people differently because they created speech.164 The court in
Western Watersheds was eminently correct to impose First Amendment scrutiny on the law at issue; not only did the law forbid trespassing for the purpose of engaging in speech, but it did so to suppress a
certain kind of speech—resource data. In fact, the law was purportedly
designed to prevent environmental activists from proving that the cattle industry was polluting waterways with fecal bacteria.165 Thus, the
law appears to have been designed to suppress particular viewpoints
as well.
By contrast, laws regulating the collection of faceprints are content- and viewpoint-neutral and should therefore receive some level of
intermediate scrutiny. They impose liability regardless of the specific
information captured by the sensors and instead impose liability on the
conduct of surveillance.166 As detailed above, the harms from widespread FRT have nothing to do with the content of what is surveilled;
instead, these harms flow from the act of continuous watching and the
corresponding behavioral effects on the data subjects. To be sure, one
of the concerns is that FRT may catch and expose a person engaged in
embarrassing behavior that they might prefer others not to know. But
other risks created by FRT—chilling effects, inability to control one’s
overall degree of exposure to the world, and data breach harms—do
not depend at all on the speech that results from use of the technology
(if any).
To address a potential counterargument, it may be appealing to
argue that one can have no interest in privacy beyond one’s own home.
Those who may be tempted to argue as such would be correct, of
course, to observe that the home represents a sacrosanct and uncontroversial zone of privacy. Moreover, this argument has received some
162. Id. at 1192.
163. Id. at 1197.
164. Id.
165. Jeff Guo, Wyoming Doesn’t Want You to Know How Much Cow Poop Is in Its Water,
WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/05/20/wy
oming-doesnt-want-you-to-know-how-much-cow-manure-is-in-its-water/ [https://perma.cc/LKH7
-4LD4].
166. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2021).
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degree of acceptance from courts; in deciding Fourth Amendment
cases, the Supreme Court has often centered much of its analysis on
whether the activities at issue occurred in the home.167 Indeed, the
Court has gone as far as to say that “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a
firm line at the entrance to the house.’”168 Thus, in Fourth Amendment
as well as tort privacy jurisprudence, categorizing information as
“public” has historically had somewhat of a talismanic power in privacy disputes, seemingly necessitating a conclusion that, if the information has been revealed in public, it can no longer fall subject to privacy claims.169
However, privacy scholars have pushed back on the tendency of
courts to give conclusive weight to whether information is accessible
in public.170 Professor Woodrow Hartzog has highlighted the problem
that what it means to be “public” is actually highly amorphous171—a
legal standard about as clear as saying, “We’ll know it when we see
it.”172 Most often, the word is used descriptively to refer to anything
that is hypothetically accessible to others.173 This definition has
proved useful to those seeking to surveil in publicly accessible
places.174 Under this construction, almost every piece of information
must be deemed public and therefore non-regulable, from one’s

167. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also Solove, supra note 65, at 496
(noting that in Kyllo, “[t]he Court’s holding relied heavily on the fact that, though conducted outside
the petitioner’s home, the surveillance was capturing information about activities within it”).
168. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
169. Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459, 467 (2019); see
also Solove, supra note 65, at 496–97 (summarizing cases where the Court refused to recognize a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” when conduct occurred in a public place); Eugene Volokh,
Tort Law vs. Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 879, 904 (2014) (“The intrusion-upon-seclusion tort
generally does not preclude surveillance in places open to large numbers of people.”). But see Nader
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (holding the defendant liable for intrusion
upon seclusion based on aggressive following of the plaintiff even where the relevant acts occurred
entirely in public).
170. Kaminski, supra note 87, at 1114–15; see Hartzog, supra note 169, at 469.
171. Hartzog, supra note 169, at 469. For a particularly disturbing application of this doctrine,
consider the case of McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 903, 905 (Tex.
App. 1991), in which a high school soccer player was denied relief after a newspaper published a
photo of him where his genitalia were accidentally exposed during a soccer game. There, the court
relied heavily on the fact that McNamara was photographed in a public place. Id. at 905. See also
Solove, supra note 65, at 538–39 (discussing the McNamara case).
172. Hartzog, supra note 169, at 469. Professor Hartzog borrows this language from Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), in which Justice Stewart criticized the
highly amorphous standard used to identify obscenity in First Amendment cases.
173. Hartzog, supra note 169, at 498.
174. Id.
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conversation in a restaurant with friends, to one’s conduct in a hotel
room with an unobscured window, to upskirt photos.175
Yet, as a practical matter, limiting this zone of privacy to one’s
own private property fails to comport with the expectations that shape
people’s behavior. Most of us do not believe that once something has
occurred outside of the home, it will be broadcast on television or
slapped on a billboard. Considering the normative and legal power that
results from calling information “public,” Professor Hartzog argues
that such labelling should more accurately reflect the practical reality
that people’s conduct is guided by their expectations of obscurity.176
As he explains, making “occurring in public” a sufficient condition for
any and all disseminations of information derived from those public
activities dramatically underplays the environmental constraints that
generally make activities that occur in public more obscure than reflected by a rigid public-private divide.177 While theoretically accessible to anyone who may view the activity, most people do not expect
that anything and everything they do outside of their home is fair game
for public discussion in any context imaginable.178 In reality, people
generally make decisions about how to conduct their lives in part
based on the level of obscurity that they can reasonably expect in that
circumstance.179 For example, a person might choose to attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in a location far away from their workplace, reasonably anticipating that doing so would decrease the likelihood of their being recognized by a co-worker. Of course, one would
not consider it a privacy harm for that person to then unexpectedly run
into a co-worker at the meeting. Yet, there is a significant difference
between that and what companies like Clearview are doing. There is a
great deal more harm involved in a company’s practice of collecting
faceprints in a way that allows it to surveil individuals through the
real-time capture of data from cameras and similar devices, or through
aggregations of data “scraped” from the internet. Widespread FRT
would potentially eviscerate any possibility for the person to make
these kinds of informed decisions. This would then result in the
chilling effects discussed above—perhaps this person who wished to
175. See id. at 461–62.
176. Id. at 518.
177. Id. at 502.
178. See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 111, 113 (2017).
179. See Kaminski, supra note 20, at 171–72; Kaminski, supra note 87, at 1136.
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attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting will not seek out the therapeutic treatment she needs at all. All this is to say that in reality, people’s privacy expectations are far from binary, and a precise analysis
of what constitutes an actionable privacy harm requires meaningfully
addressing that FRT severely restricts people’s ability to control their
own exposure to the world.
In Fourth Amendment cases, members of the Supreme Court have
begun to address precisely this issue. Justice Sotomayor stated the
problem astutely in her concurrence in United States v. Jones,180 in
which the Court held that the Government violated the Fourth Amendment when it installed a GPS on a suspected narcotics trafficker’s car
and tracked its movements for four weeks without a valid warrant.181
There, the Court relied heavily on the fact that law enforcement officers had committed a physical trespass when they initially installed the
GPS on the car.182 The Court declined to address the question of
whether the Government would have violated Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights had the GPS tracking been unaccompanied by any initial
physical invasion.183 However, in her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor
went a step further and observed that technological developments
have, in many cases, rendered physical intrusion unnecessary in order
to surveil people.184 Even without any physical contact with the data
subject or their property, surveillance systems such as location monitoring make it possible to collect a profusion of personal information.185 As Justice Sotomayor explained, this kind of technology
has the power to make visible “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting,
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”186
While the Fourth Amendment obviously does not apply to the use
of FRT by private actors (at least not directly), Justice Sotomayor’s
reasoning makes clear the problem of relying on physical trespass as
a proxy for invasion of privacy. Instead, whether a person has exceeded the bounds of acceptable information-gathering practices must

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

565 U.S. 400 (2012); see also Reidenberg supra note 52, at 150, 157 (discussing Jones).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 403–04.
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 415 (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
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take into account the subject’s expectations of obscurity. It must also
contemplate the uniquely invasive capabilities of various modern technologies.
Thus, in the same way that laws imposing liability for intruding
upon the seclusion of the home or for wiretapping protect against observations, punishing individuals for the collection of FRT data protects against practices that chill socially desirable activities, deprive
individuals of the ability to choose when to expose themselves, infringe on the “breathing room” necessary for self-development,187 and
deter people from engaging in activities that require a level of anonymity. And, ultimately, because the First Amendment does not protect information-gatherers when they go beyond neutral zones of seclusion (and the collection of faceprints belongs within this zone), the
First Amendment should not bar regulations on the collection of faceprints.
B. Use
As discussed above, legislatures should be able to regulate the
capture of faceprints without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Many laws go further, restricting the use of personal data—as distinguished from restrictions on disclosure to third parties. For example,
similar restrictions appear in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which limits credit reporting agencies’ use of consumer data to specifically delineated purposes.188 Similarly, California has restricted the use of
faceprints once already captured; with the passage of the CPRA, California consumers may instruct businesses to limit their use of faceprints to uses that are “necessary to perform the services or provide
the goods reasonably expected by an average consumer who requests
those goods or services.”189 Businesses are then obligated to use the
consumers’ faceprints only for those purposes unless consumers later
provide consent.190 Thus, if a person requests that Apple only use their
faceprint to open their phone, does the Constitution permit Apple to
disregard that request? Does Apple have a First Amendment defense
187. See Cohen, supra note 74, at 1906; see also Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 252 (2012) (“Seclusion gives people the breathing space to be and
to act without having to worry about social or economic consequences.”).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3) (2018); Richards, supra note 20, at 1191; see also id. at 1190–92
(providing other examples of use restrictions).
189. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.121(a) (West Supp. 2021); id. § 1798.140(v)(1)(E) (defining “personal information” for purposes of the CPRA to include “biometric information” like faceprints).
190. Id. § 1798.121(b).
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to use their faceprint to, for example, send targeted ads? This raises
the question of whether use restrictions are compatible with the First
Amendment.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court briefly addressed the constitutionality of use restrictions.191 The wiretap law at issue in that case
contained a provision prohibiting individuals from using the contents
of an intercepted phone call.192 The provision broadly prohibited all
uses, including using the communications of a business rival to create
a competing product, or using the information to discipline a subordinate.193 Ultimately, the Court held that the use prohibition was a regulation of conduct, not speech.194
Some courts have analyzed various data usage laws as commercial speech. For example, in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,195 the Tenth Circuit held that a law was a restriction
on commercial speech where it restricted telecommunications carriers
from using customer information to market additional services to their
customers.196 In that case, the court focused on the customers’ right to
receive information about these services rather than U.S. West’s interests in communicating that information for its own benefit as an autonomous speaker.197 It then held that the law did not survive Central
Hudson review, in part because the state had not articulated a concrete
privacy interest beyond consumers’ general unease, and because an
opt-out framework seemed sufficient to protect whatever privacy interest may have been at stake.198
The issue of use restrictions also came up in Sorrell. The statute
at issue forbid pharmaceutical marketers from using prescriber-identifying information to market or promote a prescription drug without
the physician’s consent.199 The Court reasoned that the use restriction
was content based because it burdened only speech with a particular
191. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526–27, 527 n.10 (2001).
192. Id. at 523–24.
193. Id. at 527 n.10.
194. Id. at 526–27; see also Richards, supra note 20, at 1192 (summarizing the Bartnicki holding).
195. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
196. Id. at 1230, 1232.
197. Id. at 1232. But see Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and the Digital Audience, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1597 (2019) (explaining that “[t]he commercial speech
doctrine is predicated on the audience’s right to know” and that this justification does not hold true
in much of today’s online marketing where consumers are not permitted to make informed decisions between advertised products).
198. U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1235, 1238–1239.
199. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558–59 (2011).
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content: pharmaceutical marketing by detailers.200 The Court was concerned that the Vermont Legislature was using speech restrictions to
achieve the otherwise permissible policy goal of lowering drug prices
by foreclosing large pharmaceutical companies from marketing their
drugs to physicians.201 These concerns were further supported by the
legislative history, which illustrated that the purpose of the statute was
to lower the costs of medical services by making it more difficult to
promote expensive and less safe brand-name drugs—but not their
competitors’.202 Thus, the government was regulating the use of data
“in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction,” rather than
merely restricting commercial speech.203 Further, the Court ultimately
applied Central Hudson’s test for commercial speech for argument’s
sake, and therefore it did not resolve the question of whether restricting the use of prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes was a restriction on commercial speech.204 It also did not reveal
whether a general prohibition on commercial use would be impermissible absent the fact that the government used speech to favor some
products over others. Consequently, while dicta in the majority opinion casts some doubt on the continued viability of the commercial
speech doctrine, Sorrell does not stand for the proposition that any and
all regulation of data use (even if limited to advertising purposes) presumptively violates free speech.
Unlike the statutes at issue in Sorrell and U.S. West, and like the
prohibition in Bartnicki, restrictions on the use of faceprints need not
target specific uses such as “marketing purposes.” Nor, for that matter,
should they target specific actors such as pharmaceutical marketers,
allaying concerns that use restrictions are inherently viewpoint-discriminatory. Instead, by restricting businesses’ use of faceprints to
those that consumers reasonably expect, legislatures hold businesses
liable for acting in a way that violates consumer expectations—not for
producing speech with a particular content or representing a particular
viewpoint.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 565.
See id. at 576–78.
See id. at 560–61; see also Richards, supra note 16, at 1506.
See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578–79.
Id. at 571–72.
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C. Disclosure
Unlike the collection and use of faceprints, disclosure presents a
much clearer case of a potential incursion on free speech. In this context, it seems like there is always a speaker (the disseminator of the
information), a listener (the recipient of the information), and information (the faceprints). This would meet the definition for “speech”
that the Court articulated in Spence v. Washington205: an intent to convey a message that would be understood by those who viewed it.206
However, not all communications of information warrant First
Amendment protection,207 including those that formally meet
Spence’s definition.208 More importantly, even when they do, courts
have applied a much more nuanced approach than the two tiers of strict
and intermediate scrutiny would seem to suggest.209
Instead, recall that the law generally recognizes communications
as requiring heightened First Amendment review when they fulfill the
theoretical purpose of the First Amendment: furthering public discourse, contributing to the marketplace of ideas, or promoting human
self-expression.210 Additionally, a communication might receive the
full protection of the First Amendment when it appears in a recognized
medium of expression, such as photographs.211 Patently, faceprints are
not a socially recognized medium of expression akin to photography
or art. Further, when faceprints are sold by commercial entities for
commercial purposes, disclosures of faceprints cannot reasonably be
said to further any of the above; data is generally then used for wholly
internal purposes. While faceprints could theoretically be sold to research institutions to produce socially beneficial research, such an instance should be treated as an exception rather than the rule. Instead,
there are two primary ways we might treat the sale of data between
commercial entities: as commercial speech or “purely private speech.”
I discuss each in turn, ultimately concluding that the latter would be
the proper approach.

205. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
206. Id. at 410–11; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (broadening the “particularized message” requirement from Spence).
207. See Post, supra note 110, at 1252; Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 843; Wu, supra note 110, at
1506.
208. Post, supra note 110, at 1252.
209. See Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 134–35.
210. See supra notes 113–140 and accompanying text.
211. See Kreimer, supra note 140, at 373; cf. Post, supra note 110, at 1253–54.
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1. Treating Disclosure Restrictions as Commercial Speech
Restrictions
Because commercial speech is subject to a less strict level of review, some have argued that regulating data as a form of commercial
speech is appropriate when the data will ultimately be used in something that qualifies as a form of commercial speech, or if the data will
be generated or sold as a product (as is done by data brokers, for example).
For example, Katherine Peyton has argued212 that restrictions on
the sale and use of consumer data for marketing purposes regulate
commercial speech of the kind described in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.213: speech that
merely proposes a commercial transaction.214 The prototypical example of such speech is a commercial advertisement. Per Peyton, because
the data mining industry sells data to third parties or directly uses it
for advertising purposes, and these companies make profits off of the
data, regulating uses and sales of data are a form of commercial
speech.215
This argument has some force as it pertains to some restrictions
on data use, but not disclosure. It is true that data is generally processed and sold to be used as part of the advertising industry.216 However, the fact that a company profits off of a disclosure of information
(i.e., sells it) cannot be, in and of itself, sufficient to transform a law
prohibiting that disclosure into a prohibition on commercial speech.217
Otherwise, a government could treat prohibitions on newspaper, book,
or movie sales under the more lenient commercial speech standard by
reasoning that the company profits from such sales. Thus, this cannot
be the sole basis for calling data disclosure laws regulations on commercial speech. Nor does the fact that the recipient of the information
intends to use the information for commercial purposes constitute a
regulation on commercial speech. As Professor Bhagwat has argued,
212. Kathryn Peyton, The First Amendment and Data Privacy: Securing Data Privacy Laws
that Withstand Constitutional Muster, 2019 PEPP. L. REV. 51, 75–76.
213. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
214. Id. at 762.
215. Peyton, supra note 212, at 75–76.
216. See Rebecca Harris, Note, Forging A Path Towards Meaningful Digital Privacy: Data
Monetization and the CCPA, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 197, 204 (2020).
217. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983); IMDb.com Inc. v.
Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 2020); Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 866; Balkin, supra note
20, at 1198.
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the commercial nature of speech turns on the content of the information—not the purpose for which the recipient may or may not use
the information in the future.218 While a buyer of faceprints might
want the information to generate advertising or other forms of commercial speech, the sale of faceprints themselves clearly does not propose a commercial transaction.
Further, considering the reasons why the Court granted First
Amendment protection to commercial speech illustrates the flaw of
the proposition that selling (or otherwise disclosing) faceprints should
be regulated as commercial speech. The First Amendment protects
commercial speech out of concern for the interest of consumers—the
listeners.219 Specifically, commercial speech is meant to serve listeners’ interests by providing them with useful information that can shape
their purchasing choices.220 The sale of a database does not aid its recipient (the buyer) in making any such choices about what product to
purchase; the data itself is the product.
2. Treating Disclosure Restrictions as “Matters of Purely Private
Concern”
Even though the sale of FRT cannot be categorized as commercial
speech, there remains another way to analyze restrictions on these disclosures. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,221 the
Court’s plurality opinion held that courts could award presumed and
punitive damages in defamation cases where the plaintiff was not a
public figure or official, nor was the publication on a matter of public
concern.222 The case involved a credit report that erroneously stated
that the plaintiff, a construction contractor, had filed for bankruptcy.223
After the plaintiff sued the defendant credit reporting agency for defamation, the plaintiff prevailed at trial, and the jury awarded it both
compensatory and punitive damages.224 The defendant moved for a
new trial, arguing that a showing of actual malice was required for a
defamation plaintiff to recover punitive damages.225 In doing so, the

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 866–67.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64.
See id.
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 761.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 752–54.
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defendant relied on cases like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,226
which required a showing of “actual malice” (defined as “knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not”) in order for a public figure plaintiff to prevail in a defamation
suit.227
After granting certiorari, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality held that
no such showing was required.228 In reaching that conclusion, the
Court considered the theoretical purposes of the First Amendment, and
concluded that the particular credit report at issue in that case furthered
none of them.229 In fact, the Court was highly skeptical of such an
argument, observing that “[t]here is simply no credible argument that
this type of credit reporting requires special protection to ensure that
‘debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.’”230 This did not mean that the reports merited no protection—
rather that they merited a lower level of protection consistent with the
lower constitutional value of the speech.231
Since Dun & Bradstreet, lower courts have reached similar conclusions in cases involving the disclosure of credit header information232 and the identity of individuals who purchase videos.233
Courts also employ a similar distinction in the area of speech by government employees.234 In those cases, speech is only accorded significant First Amendment protection if it concerns a matter of public importance.235 Scholars have argued for courts to conduct a similar
analysis in other areas of the law, such as nonconsensual pornography.236
Regulations on the commercial use of faceprints should be analyzed much the same way. Like the credit reports at issue in Dun &
226. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
227. Id. at 279–80.
228. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
229. Id. at 759–61.
230. Id. at 762 (second alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270); see also
Bhagwat, supra note 20, at 876 (“The disclosure of large amounts of data, especially personal data,
generally has no real connection to self-governance, no matter how broadly that concept is defined.”).
231. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (“While such speech is not totally unprotected by the
First Amendment, . . . its protections are less stringent.”).
232. Individual Reference Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 40–41
(D.D.C. 2001).
233. E.g., Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 427, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
234. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
235. See id. at 146–47.
236. See Citron & Franks, supra note 111, at 383.
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Bradstreet, the sale of faceprints generally does not enrich public discourse in any meaningful way. Considering the “content, form, and
context” of these disclosures,237 the average sale of commercial information from one entity to another does not enhance the discussion of
any issue. For example, when companies sell facial recognition data
to data brokers, no individual person has gained any knowledge. In
fact, most people would not even know when such a transaction has
occurred. Though the Court was presented squarely with this question
in Sorrell, the Court declined to resolve the case on these grounds,
suggesting that it may be disinclined to make a sweeping proclamation
that the sale of a database is speech fully protected by the First Amendment. The better way to resolve this issue would be to analyze faceprint sales as the type of purely private speech covered by Dun &
Bradstreet and subject to intermediate scrutiny—an approach that
would allow courts to realistically address both potential risks posed
by FRT and their low contributions to free speech.
One might argue that the distinction between purely private
speech and speech on matters of public interest produces line drawing
problems. This criticism is not without merit, as current jurisprudence
on whether something is a matter of purely private concern is not exceptionally well delineated.238 However, a similar problem existed
when the Court first opted to make such a distinction in defamation
law.239 Developments in these areas of jurisprudence should provide
helpful guideposts for courts to conduct similar analyses with the sale
of faceprints and other consumer data. More crucially, I am sensitive
to the criticisms that delineating between speech on “matters of public
concern” and “matters of private concern” presents the risk of courts
becoming the arbiters of what is fit for public discussion.240 Thus, in
determining that faceprint disclosures constitute private speech, courts
should pay particular attention to the absence of a human speaker (or
listener) and the fact that the information gleaned from most data disclosures does not even reach the general public. Such communications
should not be subject to lower scrutiny because they concern a topic
that people have no legitimate right to speak about, but rather because
they generally do not help people say anything at all.
237. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48).
238. See Post & Rothman, supra note 99, at 167–68.
239. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
240. See Volokh, supra note 16, at 1089.
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3. Limitations on Data Disclosure Laws
Even if regulations of commercial FRT use can be considered a
regulation on speech that is only of private concern, there are two limitations on information disclosures that any privacy statute most confront. First, the government cannot punish an entity for publishing information on matters of public concern when it has received the
information lawfully.241 In the context of FRT, this rule would apply
in instances where a party has published information derived from
faceprints. Returning to the Bartnicki case, the Court was confronted
with the question of whether an innocent recipient of an unlawfully
recorded communication could be punished for airing the recording
on a radio show.242 Plaintiffs Bartnicki and Kane were members of a
teachers’ union engaged in contentious collective-bargaining negotiations with a school board.243 While Bartnicki and Kane were discussing the negotiations over the phone, Kane spoke some rather unflattering words about the board: “If they’re not gonna move for three
percent, we’re gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . . To blow off
their front porches, we’ll have to do some work on some of those
guys.”244 Unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, an unidentified third party
had intercepted and recorded their conversation.245 That third party
then deposited the tape into the mailbox of Yocum (the head of a local
taxpayers’ organization) who then delivered it to Vopper, a radio commentator.246 Vopper played the tape on his talk show, and other media
outlets republished the text of the conversation.247 Bartnicki and Kane
filed suit against all of the media representatives as well as Yocum.248
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they had violated both the
federal and Pennsylvania state wiretapping statutes, which prohibited
a person from willfully disclosing the contents of a phone call if the
person knew the information was obtained through an illegal interception.249
Because the wiretap laws were content- and viewpoint-neutral,
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny—in fact, it barely engaged with
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See infra notes 243–259 and accompanying text.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517, 526–27 (2001).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 518–19 (omission in original).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520 & n.3, 525.
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any level of scrutiny at all.250 However, the statute’s disclosure prohibition still failed. The government identified two interests purportedly
served by the provision: first, the interest in removing incentives for
those who wanted to engage in wiretapping; and second, the interest
in minimizing harm to the individuals’ whose conversation was intercepted.251 The Court quickly dismissed the first asserted interest, reasoning that the proper way to de-incentivize wrongful conduct was to
prohibit the unlawful actor from disclosing the unlawfully acquired
information.252 However, prohibiting its disclosure by an innocent
third party did not permissibly serve that interest, particularly given
how unlikely it would be for someone to intercept a communication in
order to hand it over to a third party without some reward (though that
was precisely what happened in Bartnicki).253
While the Court did not have much difficulty in rejecting the first
asserted interest, the Court was considerably more receptive to the second—minimizing harm.254 Yet, despite the admittedly serious value
in protecting people’s private communications,255 they yielded in the
face of the strong First Amendment concerns in that case.256 Specifically, the Court focused on the fact that the airing of the recording was
a “publication of truthful information of public concern.”257 It expressly reserved the question of whether the First Amendment would
impose similar requirements on “information of purely private concern.”258 This is consistent with the Court’s narrow approach to other
privacy-versus-speech cases259—an approach that indicates the
Court’s reluctance to restrict privacy laws across the board.
Thus, Bartnicki makes clear that innocent recipients of FRT data
cannot be held liable for using the data to speak on issues of public
concern, even when the information was initially procured unlawfully.
For example, if a company were to surreptitiously provide FRT data
that revealed valuable insights about whether people were wearing
250. See id. at 526.
251. Id. at 529.
252. Id. at 529–30.
253. Id. at 530–31.
254. See id. at 532.
255. Id. at 532–33.
256. See id. at 535.
257. Id. at 533–34.
258. Id. at 533.
259. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
491 (1975); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (declining to address the
question of whether all data is speech and instead resolving the case on narrower grounds).
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face masks, a recipient could not be held liable for later writing a story
based on that information.
However, consistent with dicta in Bartnicki, the government can
impose liability on a corporation for selling (or otherwise disclosing)
that information when it has obtained the faceprints unlawfully in the
first place. This reflects the fact that the disclosure of private information can cause further invasions of privacy from continued use of
the sensitive information. It also serves to disincentivize parties from
the initial privacy invasion. At first blush, this might seem to contravene the First Amendment—how can dignitary harms outweigh the
significant weight we place on freedom of speech? But, recall that unrestrained FRT can cause damage far beyond revealing tidbits of embarrassing information.260 Limits on further disclosure are necessary
to avoid the chilling effects that occur when people know their sensitive information could be disclosed not only to the original interceptor
but also to further recipients of the information.261 From a more practical standpoint, having some degree of control over the sale of one’s
faceprint is essential to addressing data breaches and deterring identity
theft.
Apart from the concerns at issue in Bartnicki, the government also
may not punish disclosures of information where the government originally published the information itself. This principle developed in two
cases, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn262 and Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,263 both of which involved statutes forbidding the publication
of rape victims’ identities.264 In Cox, the television station had obtained the name of the victims from courthouse records.265 Similarly,
in Florida Star, the newspaper discovered the victim’s identity from a
police report.266 In both cases, much of the Court’s reasoning revolved
around the fact that the government itself had originally published the
information.267 For example, in Florida Star, the Court highlighted the
fact that the government could have chosen ample means to protect
victims’ identities aside from punishing the press: it could have redacted the information in the first place, punished government
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra notes 66–91 and accompanying text.
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533.
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
Cox, 420 U.S. at 471–72; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 472–73.
Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 526.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 491; Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
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employees for wrongfully disclosing it, or wholly abstained from publishing it.268 Yet, in both cases, the Court was careful to limit its holding to the facts before it, clearly wary of the harmful effects that a
broad holding could have on privacy rights.269
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Above, I have argued that the First Amendment analysis depends
on the activity at issue, as well as the ultimate purpose of the data usage. At the collection stage, FRT is best analyzed under an information-gathering framework under which regulation would be permissible subject to intermediate scrutiny. The First Amendment by no
means disappears in such an inquiry, but, much like the law at issue in
Bartnicki, laws governing collection of information will be permissible so long as the government has a substantial interest. Once the data
is collected, an unlawful collector can be held liable for continued use
of the data. Further, even a lawful possessor can constitutionally be
held liable for violating generic use restrictions. As for disclosures,
legislatures should be able to prohibit the disclosure of the information
by an unlawful possessor, regardless of whether the matter concerns
public discourse. However, a lawful actor who has been provided with
facial recognition data cannot be held liable for using that data in public discourse. Finally, in the unlikely chance that the government has
already publicized faceprints, the government could not then punish
parties who use that data.
A. California Privacy Law: The CCPA and CPRA
The CCPA and CPRA are the first consumer privacy laws in the
country to approximate the comprehensive data privacy laws already
found in Europe,270 and California’s first large-scale regulation of
FRT. These laws regulate businesses that either meet a revenue threshold or collect a minimum amount of personal information.271 Unlike
sectoral privacy regulations that have tended to dominate the American legislative landscape, the CCPA and CPRA mark a shift towards

268.
269.
270.
(2021).
271.

Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 534.
See id. at 532; Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
See Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1771, 1776
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (West Supp. 2021).
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the more broadly applicable regulatory approach taken in the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).272
In terms of the laws’ coverage, the CCPA and CPRA define “personal information” (PI) to cover “biometric information,” which includes “imagery of the . . . face . . . from which an identifier template,
such as a faceprint . . . can be extracted.”273 Going further, the CPRA
covers more than just imagery of the face; it includes faceprints themselves in its definition of “sensitive personal information” (SPI).274
While the statute generally exempts publicly available information
from its coverage, this does not include faceprints collected without
the consumer’s knowledge.275
As it relates to both PI and SPI, the CCPA has four main features:
(1) it requires companies to make disclosures regarding the categories
of information being collected, the purposes for which information is
being used, and the categories of third parties with whom the business
shares the information;276 (2) it provides individuals with a right to
request that businesses disclose which categories and specific pieces
of information the business has collected;277 (3) it grants individuals
the right to opt out of the sale of their data278 and institutes a duty of
nondiscrimination279 (though it allows businesses to alter their pricing
or services if directly related to a consumer’s abstention from providing personal information280); and (4) it empowers consumers to request that a business delete any personal information about them,281
although this is limited to businesses that directly collect information
from consumers rather than those that acquire the information later
on.282 The deletion right also does not apply if the information is
272. See Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
273. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(b), (o)(1)(E).
274. See id. § 1798.140(b), (ae)(2)(A) (together, defining “sensitive personal information” as
referring to the “processing of [imagery of the face from which an identifier template, such as a
faceprint, can be extracted] for the purpose of uniquely identifying a consumer”).
275. See id. § 1798.140(v)(2).
276. Id. § 1798.110(a).
277. Id. § 1798.100(a).
278. Id. § 1798.120(a).
279. Id. § 1798.125(a)(1).
280. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1).
281. Id. § 1798.105(a).
282. Chander, supra note 270, at 1754 (describing the CCPA’s right to deletion and contrasting
it with the GDPR’s more expansive right); Margot Kaminski et al., Symposium: The California
Consumer Privacy Act, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 157, 192 (2020).
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necessary to “enable solely internal uses that are reasonably aligned
with the expectations of the consumer based on the consumer’s relationship with the business and compatible with the context in which
the consumer provided the information.”283
Further, the passage of the CPRA created additional duties relating to SPI284: (1) it requires businesses that collect SPI to disclose to
the consumer which categories it will collect, the purposes for its collection and use;285 (2) it allows consumers to direct businesses to limit
their uses of SPI to those that are “necessary to perform the services
or provide the goods reasonably expected by an average consumer
who requests those goods or services,”286 and (3) it prohibits businesses who have received such directions from using or disclosing SPI
for any other purpose unless the consumer later provides consent.287
Notably, the last two duties do not apply to SPI that is “collected or
processed without the purpose of inferring characteristics about a consumer.”288
Applying all of the above to facial recognition data, the CCPA
and CPRA give consumers access to information on whether their
faceprints are being collected and used and for what purposes. If the
faceprints are collected or processed with the purpose of inferring
characteristics about consumers, they may also opt out of the use and
disclosure of their faceprints, except to the extent reasonably necessary to perform requested services or provide requested goods. The
CCPA and CPRA also let consumers request that their faceprints be

283. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(7).
284. See generally Mary T. Costigan, CPRA Series: Sensitive Personal Information,
JACKSONLEWIS: WORKPLACE PRIVACY, DATA MANAGEMENT & SECURITY REPORT (Dec. 14,
2020), https://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2020/12/articles/california-consumer-privacyact/cpra-series-sensitive-personal-information [https://perma.cc/TW72-5PSR] (explaining how the
CPRA has expanded upon the CCPA, such as by adding a category called “Sensitive Personal Information”).
285. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b). While the statute originally required businesses to disclose whether the SPI would be sold or shared and the length of time it intends to retain each category of SPI, the statute was amended by ballot initiative in late 2020 to omit these requirements.
However, that version of the statute is operative only until January 1, 2023, at which point California law will again impose these requirements.
While I do not focus on notice provisions in this Note, it is worth mentioning that they do
relate to the First Amendment as a form of compelled speech. However, in the context of commercial speech, such disclosures are subject to a lenient standard of review. They have not proven
controversial in biometric litigation.
286. Id. § 1798.121(a).
287. Id. § 1798.121(b).
288. Id. § 1798.121(d).
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deleted. Significantly, the law does not mandate that businesses first
get permission from consumers, instead operating on an opt-out basis.
Because of the opt-out framework, the law departs significantly
from Illinois’s biometric privacy law, BIPA, which requires companies to obtain consent before collecting a faceprint.289 Based on this
shortcoming alone, some would argue that the law will fail to meaningfully impact individuals’ control over their personal information.290
Others have argued that a notice-and-choice framework is wholly inadequate.291 Further, many privacy advocates have argued that the
statute is unlikely to be strongly enforced, as it creates a private right
of action that applies only in the event of a data breach; otherwise,
enforcement is left to the discretion of the newly-established California Privacy Protection Agency.292 However, with its coverage of facial
recognition data and restrictions on use and disclosure, it is a step towards greater control over California consumers’ privacy—if the First
Amendment will so permit.
B. Evaluating the CCPA’s Biometric Provisions Against the First
Amendment
Likely anticipating a First Amendment challenge to the law,
drafters of the CCPA/CPRA have expressly created various exceptions with a view towards free speech concerns. First, it contains an
exception to the deletion right: businesses need not delete faceprints if
they require that information in order to exercise free speech rights.293
While this exception might save the statute, it is not entirely helpful,
either for the enforcement agency or for the businesses who must comply—and if regulation of personal data were to be held unconstitutional in most circumstances, it would become the exception that
289. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15 (2021).
290. See Felix T. Wu, The Constitutionality of Consumer Privacy Regulation, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 69, 75–76 (outlining various suggestions to improve notice in a notice-and-consent
framework).
291. See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1660–62 (1999); Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 52, at 1399.
292. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(a); see also Carla Llaneza, Comment, An Analysis on Biometric Privacy Data Regulation: A Pivot Towards Legislation Which Supports the Individual Consumer’s Privacy Rights in Spite of Corporate Protections, 32 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 177, 196 (2020)
(arguing that a private right of action is necessary in biometric privacy statutes for meaningful
enforcement). For a criticism of the tendency to focus on the efficacy of public enforcement and
on enforcement litigation altogether as a means to alleviate privacy concerns, see Julie E. Cohen,
How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, supra note 52.
293. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(4).
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swallows the rule. Additionally, without further articulation of when
the statute does not apply, it would also run the risk of being void for
vagueness.
However, the statute does contain additional such exceptions.
Businesses need not respect a deletion request when (1) the business
requires the information to engage in scientific, historical, or statistical
research, and (2) the consumer has given informed consent—oddly,
the only instance in which use of a consumer’s faceprint requires affirmative consent.294 While one might argue that creating an exception
for scientific researchers runs the risk of making the statute underinclusive—the fatal flaw of the statute in Sorrell295—the statute explicitly requires informed consent from data subjects.296 However, this
higher consent requirement for research purposes may ultimately be
struck down because it places a higher burden on parties engaging in
research than those using it for other purposes. Thus, the legislature
should revise the statute to provide for a uniform consent requirement.
Apart from scientific research, the law also does not apply at all
to lawfully obtained, truthful information that is a matter of public
concern.297 This exception moves the statute outside of Bartnicki territory. Additionally, as for data usage, the CPRA restricts faceprint
usage based on consumers’ expectations rather than targeting a particular purpose,298 distinguishing the statute from those at issue in Sorrell
and U.S. West. Finally, the law does not apply to information that the
government has already made available.299 Interestingly, a prior version of the law had a narrower exception to the use of governmentprovided information; it foreclosed such uses only where they were
“not compatible with the purpose for which the data is maintained and
made available.”300 However, the final version of the law broadly exempts businesses from liability where the government first provided
the information.301 The law thereby avoids the problems that arose
with the rape shield laws in Cox and Florida Star.302
294. Id. § 1798.105(d)(6).
295. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572–73 (2011).
296. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d)(6).
297. Id. § 1798.140(v)(2).
298. Id. § 1798.121(a).
299. See id. § 1798.140(v)(2).
300. Memorandum from Andrew J. Pincus et al., Mayer Brown LLP, to Christopher Mohr et
al., (Jan. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YJ4E-WPUY].
301. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(2).
302. Id.

(11) 55.1_KUKIELSKI_V10.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

FIRST AMENDMENT AND FACIAL RECOGNITION

2/4/22 1:52 PM

277

While these exceptions might address the most obvious First
Amendment arguments, the most troublesome problem for the statute
lies in its failure to meaningfully address the privacy harms of FRT.
Even when the Court analyzed the Vermont statute in Sorrell as a restriction on commercial speech, it failed intermediate scrutiny because
the law could not be said to actually further the privacy interests proffered by the government; it permitted disclosure of the prescriberidentifying information for a wide variety of other purposes, including
health care research and journalism.303 In this way, perhaps the most
problematic outcome of the case was that it has put legislatures in the
double-bind of taking an all-or-nothing approach to privacy laws: either they must protect privacy to the detriment of socially valuable
uses of the information, or they cannot regulate the information at all.
From a more optimistic perspective, the main outcome of Sorrell is
that legislatures must carefully consider how a statute will actually
protect against given privacy harms and only create exceptions when
they would not endanger the statute’s objectives.
With Sorrell’s lesson in mind, I suggest that the statute be modified to require affirmative consent before a business may collect faceprints for any purpose; given the ease with which faceprints can be
captured without a consumer’s knowledge, it is difficult to explain
how an opt-out framework would provide the level of notice and control necessary to alleviate chilling effects that stem from the possibility
that one is being watched. Even if one could install software to make
their privacy preferences known to apps and websites,304 it would be
wholly unrealistic to assume that a person could communicate a deletion or opt-out request to all businesses that the person passes by when
walking on the street. Further, as the CCPA/CPRA currently stand,
those requests would be ineffective if the data has already been sold;
the deletion right applies only to businesses with a direct relationship
to the consumer and does not apply to downstream possessors.305 Instead, giving consumers control at the moment their faceprints are captured would allow them to choose which businesses they would like
to entrust with their sensitive data.

303. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572–73 (2011).
304. For a discussion of global opt-outs, see Kaminski et al., supra note 282, at 170, 193–94.
305. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a); Kaminski et al., supra note 282, at 192–93.
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V. CONCLUSION
In a brief filed in support of Clearview’s motion to dismiss, various amici criticize the plaintiffs for “convert[ing] a descriptive account into a prescriptive one.”306 In other words, just because we have
grown accustomed to a certain level of obscurity does not mean that it
is the most desirable level.307 Time may prove them correct; maybe
the level of obscurity in which we currently live is truly undesirable.
But maybe it isn’t. And if privacy expectations continue playing
a role in determining whether one has experienced a legally cognizable
privacy harm that might outweigh undoubtedly important First
Amendment interests, the problem is that sitting back and waiting for
harms to reveal themselves will come too late. It would be extremely
difficult for a person to be able to convincingly argue they have a reasonable expectation that a corporation will not collect their faceprint
when corporations have been doing so for years. Moreover, if legislatures are not able to control the collection and dissemination of faceprints, it will be impossible for consumers to claw back that data years
after it has already been in circulation. In other words, failing to regulate FRT now may well make it impossible to regulate at all.
These concerns about facial recognition technology go beyond
the “offensiveness” of speech that drives other speech restrictions.
FRT does not merely offend a person’s sense of propriety the way the
word “fuck” on a t-shirt might. Nor does it merely seek to redress individual senses of embarrassment. It presents real risks that threaten
our ability to navigate the world with some degree of control over who
we expose ourselves to. Further, it serves as yet another powerful tool
for Big Data to tighten its grip on consumers.
I conclude by reiterating that determining that states can regulate
FRT does not mean that they must. Perhaps, as has been suggested
with HIPAA, compliance with biometric rules will be too costly for
our society.308 Or, as some suggest, we may ultimately choose that the
benefits of widespread FRT outweigh the costs.309 To draw from an
oft-used metaphor in privacy literature, sunshine might well be the
306. Brief of Amici First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law and Professors of Law Eugene Volokh and Jane Bambauer in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 11–12, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020CH04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Brief of Amici First
Amendment Clinic].
307. See id.
308. Bambauer, supra note 187, at 264.
309. See Brief of Amici First Amendment Clinic, supra note 306, at 18–19.
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best disinfectant. But the First Amendment does not require us to relegate ourselves to our homes to avoid its blinding light.
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